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Abstract  
There are real political and social barriers to climate mitigation that arise from multi-
actor dynamics and micro-economic decisions. Exploratory analysis that captures key 
uncertainties in the energy system, including behaviour, is crucial for policy design 
aimed at achieving ambitious greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation targets. This paper 
explores the case for developing policy assessments that include non-optimal 
behaviour in energy systems modelling. A stochastic system dynamic model of the 
energy system that features multiple actors with differentiated behaviours is used to 
investigate energy transition pathways that deviate from strict economic rationality. 
The results illustrate the risks of basing GHG reduction strategies on analysis that 
overlooks key insights into decision making from fields such as behavioural 
economics and political science. 
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Highlights  
• Dynamic stochastic model of energy transitions used to explore actor 
behaviour 
• Uncertainty analysis explores impact of sub-optimal actor choices and 
policies 
• Behaviour could be as significant as the techno-economic drivers of 
transitions 
• Climate targets difficult to achieve without idealised assumptions about 
behaviour 
• Energy systems modelling must expand consideration of socio-political 
factors 
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1.0 Introduction 
 
1.1 The case for exploratory analysis of climate mitigation policies 
The 2015 Paris Agreement sets the stage for long term global reductions in 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions before the end of the century [1]. While there 
remain doubts over the cumulative level of ambition implied by current national 
pledges ([2] and [3]), the apportioning of the remaining global carbon budget [4], and 
whether or not a 1.5°C or 2°C stabilisation will be sufficient to avoid “dangerous” 
anthropogenic warming ([5], [6] and [7]), many nations are nevertheless striving to 
explore pathways to deep decarbonisation ([8] and [9]). The “ratchet” mechanism in 
the Paris Agreement that requires signatories to periodically update their pledges for 
GHG mitigation means that there is likely to continue to be a long term focus on 
energy systems analysis and energy transition pathways. 
Quantitative formal models of energy systems play a central role in this endeavour by 
providing an exploratory framework for thinking about the future, and developing the 
evidence base for long term policy decisions [10]. Energy system models used for 
decarbonisation pathway analysis operate at multiple scales, with global models used 
for integrated assessment of climate impacts [11], national models used for exploring 
domestic trajectories towards low carbon futures [12], and sectoral models used to 
explore detailed technological transitions in key end-use sectors such as power, 
transport and buildings [13]. Reviews by Jebaraj and Iniyan [14], Bhattacharyya and 
Timilsina [15],and Pfenninger et al. [16] can give the reader an overview of many 
common types of energy models used in policy analysis. 
When discussing the use of models for decision making, it is useful to reflect on the 
work of Börjeson et al. [17] who distinguish between predictive, explorative and 
normative analysis. The complexity of assessing long term (i.e. multi-decadal) 
transitions in energy systems precludes the use of quantitative models for predictive 
(what will happen?) purposes, especially given that future energy transitions are 
subject to conditions of deep uncertainty [18]. Energy systems models therefore tend 
to be used for either normative analysis, to determine how specific targets can be 
reached, or explorative analysis that aims to map out the landscape of plausible 
futures.  
Deep decarbonisation analysis at the national scale (e.g. as demonstrated for 
countries such as the United States [19], the United Kingdom [20], or Portugal [21]) is 
likely to become a key focus for the modelling community in the future as individual 
countries review their Paris Agreement commitments. Quantitative analysis in 
support of strategic decarbonisation planning is carried out using a variety of 
techniques, with the classic distinction being between macroeconomically complete 
top-down models, technology rich bottom-up models, and hybrids (see [22] and [9]). 
Energy system optimisation models (ESOMs) are a popular class of bottom-up 
models that explore dynamic trade-offs between technology and resources. 
Examples of ESOMs in widespread use include OSeMOSYS [23], MARKAL [24], and 
TIMES [25]. Such models are often subject to several common critiques. 
Mathematically optimal solutions are often fragile to relatively small perturbations in 
the objective function, with the result that large changes in what could be interpreted 
as the “best” course of action can sometimes be found within a relatively small range 
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of costs (see [26] and [27]). It has been suggested that over-reliance on cost-
optimisation risks leading to overly deterministic analysis that investigates only a 
narrow range of possible futures [28], and that heavily constrained model runs might 
simply be reflecting the biases (conscious or otherwise) of the model operator [29]. It 
is also argued that ESOMs with perfect foresight can lead policymakers to under-
estimate the challenge of using policy instruments to drive energy transitions, both 
because technology switching (if not constrained by other factors) occurs rapidly in 
the models and because costs are often the only modelled driver behind technology 
selection [30]. Ex post analysis of past scenario studies based on cost-optimisation 
analysis sometimes finds that nearly all real world developments have occurred 
outside of the previously modelled range of outcomes [31]. There is therefore a 
material requirement for new approaches to energy systems analysis that attempts a 
broader consideration of uncertainties [32]. 
The strong and active research community around energy systems modelling is 
making a number of parallel efforts to respond to these challenges. Modellers 
continue to develop techniques to expand the consideration of uncertainty in models. 
For example, approaches for understanding parametric uncertainties (e.g. by using 
Monte Carlo analysis [33]) and structural uncertainties (e.g. through implementing 
Modelling-to-Generate Alternatives approaches [34]) in models are becoming more 
widespread, as are multi-model comparison exercises [35]. Attempts to improve the 
representation of decision making include the development of myopic optimisation 
models [36] and models that employ stochastic programming and robust 
optimisation techniques [37]. Finally, there are efforts to improve the representation 
of actor behaviour in energy systems models. While it has long been typical practice 
to vary hurdle rates in ESOMs to explore time preference variation, models that 
account for a wider spectrum of behavioural parameters, such as heterogeneous 
choice behaviour, are becoming increasingly common [13]. 
 
1.2 Behavioural complexity in energy modelling 
This paper focuses primarily on exploring the influence of non-optimal actor 
behaviour on long term decarbonisation pathways, as part of wider efforts to better 
address key uncertainties in energy systems analysis. That key stakeholders and 
individuals do not always exhibit purely cost optimising behaviour has been 
empirically observed for decades in energy policy. For example, rational economic 
analysis indicates that building energy efficiency measures are a “low hanging fruit” 
that should be rapidly adopted due to their cost-effective contribution to GHG 
mitigation, fuel poverty reduction, and energy security objectives. However, non-cost 
barriers to the widespread adoption of energy efficiency measures have historically 
prevented uptake to the levels expected by policymakers (e.g. [38] and [39]), in a 
phenomenon often termed “the energy efficiency gap” ([40] and [41]).  
Failure or under-achievement in energy efficiency programmes is unfortunately 
common, with the collapse of the UK Government’s flagship thermal improvement 
programme, the “Green Deal” being a recent prominent example [42]. During its 
short lifespan, the scheme achieved penetration rates far below anticipated levels 
and was abruptly cancelled with no replacement policy in place. A post-mortem 
report by the UK National Audit Office (NAO) linked the spectacular failure of the 
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programme directly to poor policy design, which did not account for key behavioural 
factors in the consumer analysis and which ultimately “did not persuade householders 
that energy efficiency measures are worth paying for” [43].  
Clearly, behavioural uncertainties cannot be safely ignored in policy design. Analysis 
shows that achieving deep decarbonisation is likely to require GHG reductions across 
the economy [8], including not only changes to energy generation but also in end-use 
demand sectors such as industry, buildings and transport. The level of agency that 
policymakers possess to influence transitions will vary by sector. In some countries, 
energy generation and other large industries may be state-owned or strongly 
regulated, giving the government powerful levers to direct investment in low carbon 
alternatives to fossil fuels. However, in all but the most repressive regimes, 
governments often have comparatively little influence over individual choices made 
by private citizens about what products they choose to purchase and use in their daily 
lives. This introduces significant uncertainties into decarbonisation pathways that are 
related to consumer behaviour in areas such as homes (e.g. building heating) and 
personal mobility (particularly road transport). 
These uncertainties are often difficult to capture explicitly or remain underexplored in 
much energy systems analysis. It is typical for energy economy models to employ 
mathematical formulations based on cost optimisation, representing the allocation of 
resources on the basis of a single social planning agent who acts with perfect 
foresight. This omnipotent actor has no direct counterpart in reality, and acts as a 
representative proxy for high levels of collaboration, forward planning, and 
information exchange between different countries (at the global level) and economic 
sectors (at the national scale). This abstraction is not a barrier to the use of such tools 
for identifying cost-optimal pathways to normative futures, but does pose particular 
challenges when models are used in a more exploratory fashion to understand the 
range of possible futures that might transpire. For discussion purposes, we can 
further disaggregate behavioural uncertainties into:  
i. The dynamics of decision making between actors and institutions, and;  
ii. Micro-economic decision making by individual actors 
 
1.2.1 Behavioural dynamics between actors and institutions 
Historical analysis of past energy transitions shows that socio-technical change is 
often driven by politics and the power gradients between key stakeholders that 
supported different technologies or infrastructures. Useful examples can be found in 
a variety of sources, such as the work of Fouquet and Pearson [44], Sovacool [45], 
Fouquet [46], and Wilson and Grübler [47]. Historically, transformative changes in 
energy have only taken place relatively slowly, over multi-decade timescales [48], in 
contrast to the rapid transitions often observed in models. Real-world decision 
making occurs between multiple parties against a shifting set of political, economic 
and social priorities. This results in an environment where poorly coordinated policies, 
policies that directly oppose one another, or policies that are implemented in law but 
not enforced in practice can and do exist simultaneously. This leads to a policy 
environment that is sometimes characterised as being of a “second-best” nature ([49] 
and [50]), in contrast to the idealised “first-best” policymaking often found in models. 
Modellers themselves often acknowledge that the degree of coordination that needs 
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to be assumed in order to represent rapid transitions towards a climate stabilised 
future might prove to be “highly unlikely” [51] and that efforts to represent delays, 
inertia or imperfections in transition governance are needed.  
 
1.2.2 Micro-economic behaviour 
As well as addressing the uncertainties related to the politics and governance 
dynamics of group decision making, another area for improving behavioural realism 
in energy modelling lies in the representation of individual actor choices. Energy 
models often rely on highly abstracted representations of individual choice at the 
micro-economic level. The dominant theoretical paradigm is to assume that 
investment behaviour will follow a pattern of rational choice and utility maximisation 
[52]. Thus, the rapid adoption of technological alternatives to fossil fuels is often 
observed in models when their costs fall below a certain inflection point. However, a 
wide body of evidence points towards real-world micro-economic decisions being 
more complex than a purely price-driven framework might suggest.  
For example, it has been found that while prices are important determinants of 
purchasing behaviour, individual decisions are also strongly affected by social norms 
and customs (e.g. [53], [54] and [55]). Individuals often make choices that are 
influenced by non-price factors such as aesthetics, branding, or perceived reliability 
[56], and also act under conditions of bounded rationality without the time to 
exhaustively compare every possible option open to them ([57]and [58]). Finally, the 
desire for purchases to consciously reflect individual values in consumer society may 
also play a strong role in determining choices [59]. In summary, not only are different 
actors and institutions in the energy system likely to interact in a complex fashion, 
with different objectives and time horizons for making decisions, but costs will almost 
certainly not be the only factor influencing their future choices. 
 
1.3 Towards an improved representation of actors and behaviour in energy modelling 
Clearly, the rational choice basis for energy economic modelling is an abstraction that 
may have its shortcomings for exploratory, as opposed to normative, analysis. An 
improved representation of behaviour ([60] and [61]) and more explicit 
representation of actors and institutions ([62] and [63]) have both been argued to be 
important elements in improving the utility of energy models for policymaking. A 
number of energy economy models have been demonstrated with some degree of 
heterogeneous behaviour, including GCAM [64], IMAGE/TIMER [65], MESSAGE-
Transport [66], TIMES [67], CIMS [68], and IMACLIM [69], but heterogeneous choice 
is still the exception rather than the rule in most model studies. The roles of actors 
and institutions tend to be mostly represented by discrete scenarios rather than 
endogenously represented in models. There appear to be a number of promising 
agent-based tools in development that could be applied for exploring 
decarbonisation pathways for climate stabilisation (e.g. [70] and [71]) but most 
published examples deal with sub-sectors of the energy economy and agent-based 
approaches have yet to scale fully to whole system analysis [72]. 
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This paper aims to investigate the impact of actor behaviour on transitions to a low carbon 
future using BLUE, an energy model for the United Kingdom (UK) that incorporates 
multiple actors with differentiated micro-economic behavioural parameters. The UK is by 
no means unique amongst nations in having set out concrete ambitions to decarbonise its 
economy. It does however, remain an interesting case study, because of the presence of a 
long term, legally binding domestic emissions target for 2050 (the Climate Change Act 
2008, see [73]) that enjoys broad cross party political support and forms the basis for 
important interventions in the established energy system (e.g. reform of the electricity 
market [74]). The UK is also an example of a country where energy models, in particular 
ESOMs, have come to form an important part of an active science-policy interface (see [75] 
and [76]). 
 
In order to explore actor behaviour, transition pathways in the energy system that deviate 
from strict economic rationality are modelled in the context of other key uncertainties such 
as fuel prices and technology costs. Energy transitions in different sectors resulting from 
the use of a social planning perspective and cost-optimal behaviour are compared against 
counterfactual cases where actors make a range of heterogeneous choices, some of them 
non-optimal, and have different perspectives on valuing the future. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: 
• Section 2.0 briefly outlines some of the key features of BLUE, the energy 
model used in the study 
• Section 3.0 describes the analytical approach taken in the paper for 
exploring behavioural uncertainties in energy transitions 
• Section 4.0 presents the results of the model-based analysis, covering 
how transitions in key sectors (power, residential, road transport) are 
affected by different behavioural assumptions 
• Section 5.0 discusses the main findings of the paper, including the 
implications for policymaking and future research 
• Section 6.0 draws together the key insights from the paper and presents 
the author’s conclusions about the value of modelling non-optimal 
behaviour in decarbonisation pathway analysis 
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2.0 Behaviour, Lifestyles and Uncertainty Energy model (BLUE) 
The Behaviour, Lifestyles and Uncertainty Energy model (BLUE), is a system dynamic 
model of the UK energy system that simulates technological change, energy use, and 
emissions. BLUE features multiple energy technologies in a bounded system 
framework, several heterogeneous actors whose decisions can influence the direction 
of energy transitions, and includes time horizons suitable for long term policy 
assessment. Detailed information on the model structure, operation and inputs 
(including, for example, the mathematical equations and data sources used) can be 
found in the Appendix for this paper. Readers may also wish to refer to the online 
model documentation [77], which is periodically updated to reflect the latest changes 
to the model.  
The conceptual topology of BLUE is shown below in Figure 1. Briefly, the landscape 
module (1) contains key system-wide parameters such as demand drivers, fuel costs, 
and user-defined policy interventions such as pollution taxes on GHG emissions. The 
regime supply module (2) is a single actor responsible for balancing energy demand 
and supply in the electricity and primary fuel systems. The regime demand module (3) 
comprises multiple actors, each being an independent social planner whose decisions 
affect their own economic sector. The niche developments (4) that can be explored in 
BLUE include exogenous changes to technology costs through time as well as 
changes to lifestyles, which affect end-use energy demand. 
Figure 1 – Behaviour Lifestyles and Uncertainty Energy (BLUE) Model 
 
 
Energy demand growth in BLUE occurs over time in response to the exogenous 
demand drivers in the landscape module. Nearly all other model inputs are captured 
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as probabilistic distributions to reflect uncertainty in both technology costs and actor 
behavioural parameters, with stochastic Monte Carlo simulation (typically with n=500 
or greater) used to understand the potential variation in pathways across the time 
horizon. As the capital stock in each sector (heating systems, transport fleets etc.) 
ages and needs replacing, the individual energy system actors each make myopic 
decisions about investments based on their own differentiated micro-economic 
perspectives on how to value new technologies. The supply actor not only has to 
cyclically replace aging generation plant, but also has to respond to any growth in 
demand from other sectors over time. The myopic formulation can be characterised 
as being of the “limited foresight” type (actor decisions are made in a series of 
discrete time horizons that do not overlap) in the taxonomy of Keppo and Strubegger 
[36], rather than the “moving decision window” approach. As a result of the myopic 
model formulation, none of the actors have advance knowledge of the future 
decisions of any of the other stakeholders in the system, producing a dynamic series 
of interactions through time, partially addressing the requirement to improve 
representation of actors and institutions in the energy system ([62] and [63], see 
Section 1.2.1). Exogenous changes to policies, technology costs and lifestyles that 
occur across the time horizon have the potential to affect the direction of the energy 
transition. 
In order to answer the call in the literature for better representation of micro-
economic decision making ([60] and [61], see Section 1.2.2), individual sector actors 
in BLUE can be configured with different behavioural parameters. Demand elasticities 
for each actor reflects their sensitivity to changes in energy prices i.e. whether and by 
how much they might curtail their energy use in response to price increases. 
Intangible costs or benefits for different actors can be used to ty and capture non-
monetary costs/benefits of different technology choices. Hurdle rates can be used to 
indicate the extent to which different actors value the present compared to the future 
and their resulting attitudes towards investments with high up front capital costs. 
Market heterogeneity in each sector represents the degree to which various actors 
exhibit “cost optimising behaviour” i.e. how relative cost differentials between 
competing investment options are viewed in the decision making process. 
The model is designed to be computationally light weight and able to solve quickly for 
large numbers of Monte Carlo runs. Supply-demand balances are resolved through 
recursive simulation, with power system requirements determined using a simple 
peak demand equation that distinguishes between the ability of different 
technologies to contribute to base load generation capacity. The model focuses on 
the energy system, and interactions with the wider macro economy are not captured 
endogenously. Future updates to BLUE, which is under active development, may 
expand the model functionality in these areas but do not feature in the version used 
for this paper. 
 
3.0 Analytical Approach 
To investigate the effect of including a broader variety of behavioural assumptions in 
energy systems modelling, a number of stylised decarbonisation trajectories are 
modelled for the UK. As well as illustrating idealised conditions that approximate the 
type of cost-optimal decisions and friction-free policy environments often found in 
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cost optimisation models, non-optimal behaviour is also explored. Three different 
sets of conditions for policy implementation (P1, P2, P3) and three different sets of 
behavioural assumptions (B1, B2, B3) are investigated for a total of nine scenarios.  
In order to capture parametric uncertainties in many of the underlying parameters 
such as cost and technology performance, most inputs are captured as probabilistic 
distributions (for a full list of assumptions and parameters, readers should refer to the 
Appendix). 
 
3.1 Technology and resource assumptions 
All scenarios are run with the same settings for technology and resources. Future 
improvements in low carbon technologies are represented by having their costs 
reduce over time at uncertain rates, representing exogenous technological change. 
Uncertainty in future fuel costs for all scenarios are captured as triangular 
distributions that reflect the UK Government’s perspective on high, low, and central 
cases for coal, oil, and natural gas prices [78], while the various components of 
generation plant costs (capital expenditure, operational expenditure, etc.) are also 
implemented as distributions based on data from government commissioned studies 
[77]. Ranges for capturing uncertainty in the current and future costs and 
performance of building heating technologies and road vehicles are taken from 
various industry and government sources, generally as uniform distributions [77]. 
The following analysis assumes that carbon capture and storage (CCS) infrastructure 
will become commercially available in the UK from 2030 onwards at the earliest, as 
UK efforts to begin technology demonstration programmes this decade have 
suffered significant delays [79]. Decarbonisation pathway modelling is often 
extremely sensitive to the availability of bioenergy, because when combined with 
CCS, this allows models to follow a negative emissions sequestration strategy [80]. 
The wisdom of relying on an approach that hopes to remove greenhouse gases from 
the atmosphere in future decades rather than preventing its release in the first 
instance is the subject of significant controversy in the climate policy community (e.g. 
[81] and [82]). Bioenergy availability in the analysis presented is aligned with the 
upper end of the range found in the work of the UK Committee on Climate Change 
(the statutory climate regulator), which is around 500 TWh, or 1800 PJ ([83] and [84]). 
These constraints allow for some bioenergy CCS (BECCS) deployment, but they 
prevent a negative emissions approach from dominating the energy transition 
pathways explored. 
 
3.2 Policy conditions 
The ability of government to pass legislation that drives transitions towards new low 
carbon technologies is represented by a range of deterministic, exogenous carbon 
price trajectories, described in Table 1. Despite climate targets for the UK being 
written into law, the long term sustainability of the UK Climate Change Act 2008 and 
the level of commitment that future governments will ascribe to climate policy 
remains uncertain and therefore represents a significant risk to future low carbon 
transitions [85].  
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In lieu of detailed modelling of policy instruments, such as an actual carbon tax, the 
carbon price is used here to represent the level of effective government action on 
emissions mitigation. As well as modelling an idealised future where strong 
mitigation action is applied consistently over the time horizon, cases where political 
barriers or changing levels of ambition result in sub-optimal policymaking 
(represented by volatile or weak carbon price signals) are also considered. Carbon 
pricing is based on the UK Government’s projected trajectories for the traded value of 
CO2 between 2010 and 2050 [74].  
 
Table 1 – Policy conditions 
Reference Name Description BLUE Parameters 
P1 Idealised policy 
This illustrates a stylised future 
where the UK Government is able to 
drive a transition towards a low 
carbon future with few barriers to 
implementation. 
This case applies the UK 
Government’s high trajectory for CO2 
pricing without any volatility. This 
reaches 300 £/tCO2 by 2050 [74]. 
P2 
Second-best 
Policy 
This case implies that the 
Government implements policies 
aimed at transitioning the energy 
system towards low carbon 
technologies, but allows for some 
volatility. This captures a future 
transition where government 
policies are not always consistent, 
where government must contend 
with powerful vested interests, and 
where not all market externalities 
can be internalised. 
This case applies an uncertain 
distribution with the UK 
Government’s low (£100/tCO2 
by 2050) and high (£300/tCO2 
by 2050) projections [74] i.e. 
the effective carbon price in 
any given year is randomly 
sampled across the range. 
P3 
Dysfunctional 
Policy 
This case implies a future where the 
Government faces strong challenges 
to passing effective legislation to 
drive emissions mitigation and the 
effective carbon price signal is both 
lower and more volatile than in case 
P2. Energy transitions may still occur 
as relative costs for alternatives to 
fossil fuel technologies change 
through the modelled time horizon. 
This case applies an uncertain 
distribution that is both wider and 
lower than that found in P2. The UK 
Government’s low (£100/tCO2 by 
2050) trajectory for CO2 pricing is 
taken as the upper boundary for the 
distribution, while the lower bound is a 
zero effective carbon price. 
 
3.3 Behavioural parameters 
Non-optimal actor behaviour is explored principally through varying the market 
heterogeneity and hurdle rate parameters in the BLUE model, both of which affect 
actor decision making with regard to technology investment: 
i. Market heterogeneity affects the extent to which costs alone drive actor 
decision making. The brief literature review outlined earlier in Section 
1.2.2 gives a rapid overview of the many factors besides costs that can 
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affect individual choice. By default, actors can be configured with one of 
four illustrative ranges for market heterogeneity: cost optimising 
behaviour, strong price sensitivity, partial price sensitivity, or price 
insensitive behaviour. With cost optimising behaviour (v=20-50) actors will 
choose the least cost option almost every time, even if the economic 
benefits of doing so are very small. For example, at v=50, a 5% saving 
between two competing technologies results in a 95% uptake of the 
cheaper option. For cases with more than two technologies, the relative 
differences in net present value dictate the market shares of the less 
“optimal” choices, as shown in the key equations documented in the 
Appendix. Under conditions of strong price sensitivity (v=10-19) actors 
react strongly to prices, but prices do not entirely guide their decisions. 
For example, with v=15, a >30% saving between options would be 
needed before an actor replaced their entire capital stock with the 
lowest cost alternative. When set to partial price sensitivity (v=5-9), 
actors are still price conscious but often require very large cost savings 
before undertaking a total switch to cheaper technologies. For example, 
at v=5, a >70% saving is required before an actor would choose to 
completely replace an incumbent technology with a lower cost 
alternative. Finally, if actors are configured with price insensitive 
behaviour (v=0-4), then they may not react strongly to prices at all, even 
if there are large potential cost savings to be made. With v=0, actors will 
select equal shares of the available options. For example, if there are two 
competing technologies, then they will simply choose 50% of each, if 
there are three options, then the market will comprise a 33% share of 
each, and with four options, actors will purchase 25% of each. 
 
ii. Hurdle rate settings affect actor sensitivity to up-front investment. As a 
result of their often strong influence on model outcomes, there is 
spirited debate over the appropriate use of hurdle rates in energy 
economic modelling which is beyond the scope of this paper, but which 
enters ethical and philosophical territory, such as questions of morality, 
intergenerational equity, and the role of the state [86]. The UK 
Government uses a social discount rate of 3.5% for policy evaluation [87] 
and rates between 3-6% are typical in European policy assessment [88]. 
However, there are a wide range of factors that cause individual choices 
to deviate from the social optimum. Individual actors are exposed to 
investment risks in the way which society at large is not because their 
assets are typically not as diversified [89]. Policy assessment is 
sometimes carried out using discount rates that approximate the typical 
financial cost of capital available to private companies and individuals 
e.g. 9-17% [90] . Private discount rates revealed for individual decision 
making can be much higher and have even been estimated as being 
great as 30%, 50%, or even 80% [91]. 
Intangible costs are ignored for this study (i.e. set to zero), while demand elasticities 
take the default values from the documentation [77], which can also be found in the 
Appendix. 
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Table 2 – Behavioural parameters 
Reference Name Description BLUE Parameters 
B1 
Cost-optimal 
decisions, social 
discounting 
These settings approximate the 
representation of individual choice 
found in a typical cost-optimisation 
model 
 
All actors are configured with cost 
optimising behaviour 
The market heterogeneity parameter in 
BLUE (v) is set for all actors to be 
between v=20 and v=50 
All actors take a long term social 
planning perspective on valuing the 
future 
Hurdle rates (r) of between r=3% and 
r=6% are used in evaluating 
technology investments 
B2 
Heterogeneous 
decisions, social 
discounting 
These settings are used to explore 
futures where actor decision making 
is not purely price-driven 
 
The behaviour of firms is modelled 
as being more cost driven than 
individuals. The power, industry and 
commercial sector actors are 
modelled as having strong price 
sensitivity. The residential and road 
transport actors are modelled as 
having partial price sensitivity 
The market heterogeneity 
parameter in BLUE (v) is set for 
firms as being between v=10 
and v=19, while for individuals 
it is modelled as being between 
v=5 and v=10 
All actors are modelled as taking a 
social perspective on investment 
decisions 
Hurdle rates (r) of between 
r=3% and r=6% are used for all 
actors 
B3 
Heterogeneous 
decisions, 
individual 
discounting 
As B2 but all actors are modelled as 
taking an individual perspective on 
investment decisions 
Hurdle rates (r) of between 
r=9% and r=17% are used for all 
actors 
 
3.4 Demand drivers 
For all scenarios, demand drivers in BLUE are deterministically aligned with the 
baseline projections for energy service demands used by the UK Government’s 
Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) in their UK TIMES 
model (UKTM) [92]. This model has been used by the Government as part of their 
approach to establishing a strategy for meeting the UK’s Fifth Carbon Budget [93] 
and will inform the Governments’ forthcoming Emissions Reduction Plan. Demand 
growth in the following analysis therefore reflects the Government’s central 
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perspective applied in their long term policy assessment activities, and includes for 
example, improvements to the thermal efficiency of the building stock, large 
increases in per capita demand for transport, particularly air travel, and a significant 
decline in the energy intensity of domestic industry.  
 
4.0 Results  
Multiple studies (e.g. [94], [95] and [96]) show that a UK climate mitigation strategy 
based around the rapid decarbonisation of the power grid followed by electrification 
of heating and road vehicles is likely to play a strong role in hitting national GHG 
reduction targets for 2050. The results below first detail the outcomes found in the 
power, residential and road transport sectors, before moving on to illustrate the 
overall levels of emissions reductions achieved under the different behavioural 
scenarios assessed. 
 
4.1 Power sector 
Figure 2 illustrates technological change in the power sector, using the median results 
from the Monte Carlo simulations carried out for each scenario. The results are 
presented as a grid that compares the three sets of policy conditions discussed in 
Section 3.2 (P1, P2, P3) against the three sets of behavioural parameters outlined in 
Section 3.3 (B1, B2, B3). The top left panel (P1B1), represents an energy transition 
that occurs under the conditions commonly assumed in cost optimisation models i.e. 
actors are rational agents who made choices based on costs, actors take a long term 
perspective on valuing the future when making investment decisions, and the 
government faces few barriers to effective implementation of energy policy 
measures. All of the other panels represent the modelled outcomes of transitions 
where actors do not behave according to these ideals. The bottom right panel for 
example (P3B3), represents an energy transition under challenging conditions. Here, 
actors are motivated by costs to varying degrees, but other factors influence their 
choices, actors are more risk averse and less forward thinking with their investment 
decisions, and government energy policy on climate mitigation is both weaker and 
more volatile than hoped for. 
All nine scenarios represent differing degrees of technological change in the power 
sector. Policy conditions are a strong driver of change. It can be seen that under all 
scenarios the share of coal used for energy production (in grey) falls over time in 
response to the carbon price signals applied in the model. Both the P1 (Idealised 
policy) and P2 (Second-best policy) scenario sets achieve very strong transitions away 
from fossil fuels (coal, in grey, and unabated natural gas, in orange) towards low and 
zero carbon alternatives. Nuclear (red), wind (light and dark blue), solar photovoltaics 
(yellow) bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (deep green), and gas with 
carbon capture and storage (pale green) all feature in the transition. Carbon capture 
and storage technologies using coal are never deployed, as modelled costs never fall 
to levels where they actors deem them to be attractive. The P3 (Dysfunctional policy) 
scenario set also sees a reduction in fossil fuel use, although as might be expected, 
this is more muted than in the other scenarios which have much stronger carbon 
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pricing. In contrast to the P1 and P2 scenario sets, the role of nuclear of nuclear power 
is significantly reduced, and BECCS is not deployed in the P3 scenarios. 
Behavioural changes between scenarios introduce less pronounced, but nevertheless 
noticeable effects. Introducing heterogeneous choice i.e. moving from the B1 set 
(Cost-optimal decisions) to the B2 set (Heterogeneous decisions), does not produce a 
large difference in outcomes. This is because under the heterogeneous choice set of 
scenarios, the power sector is still represented as being strongly cost sensitive (if not 
perfectly cost optimal), as highlighted in Section 3.2 (Table 1), so broadly similar 
choices are made regarding technologies. Changing actor sensitivity to up-front 
costs, however, by moving from the B2 set (social discounting) to B3 set (individual 
discounting), has a much more visible impact. Low carbon alternatives to fossil fuels 
diffuse into the power system both later in the time horizon and at slower rates. More 
challenging policy conditions accentuate this effect. For example, in the case of 
scenario P3B3, it can be seen that natural gas (orange) is still the dominant source of 
electricity generation by 2050. 
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Figure 2 – Power sector technology transitions (simulated median) 
 
 
4.2 Residential buildings 
Figure 3 summarises the changes to heating technologies observed in residential 
buildings, with median simulation results shown for each scenario. As with the 
previous panel chart shown for the power sector (Figure 2), each graph represents the 
outcome of a different set of policy and behavioural conditions.  Panel P1B1 
illustrates the outcome of a transition with model settings that approximate 
conditions found in a typical cost optimisation model. Under this idealised transition, 
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the electrification of heat demand is strongly visible. As the electricity grid 
decarbonises and the costs of carbon-intensive heating using natural gas increases, 
gas boilers (in orange), lose relative market share to electrical heating solutions, 
including air source heat pumps (pink) and direct electric heating (pale yellow). Under 
P1B1, more than half of the residential heating portfolio in 2050 is made up of air 
source heat pumps, supplied by low carbon electricity. However, as we introduce 
behavioural imperfections into our analysis, the results from the other 8 panels in 
Figure 3 show that this strong transition towards electrification is an outcome that is 
not universally replicated.  
The weaker and more volatile carbon price signals introduced in the P2 and P3 policy 
sets results in a slower adoption of electric heating or even a net reduction in electric 
heating. Although the costs of air source heat pumps do fall in the model between 
2010 and 2050, the average cost of electricity is also increasing at the same time as a 
result of the deployment of large amounts of low carbon generation, as shown earlier 
in Section 4.1. Meanwhile, the model assumes that demand for building heating is 
falling as homes become, on average, more efficient over time. The increased costs of 
gas heating associated with the introduction of carbon pricing are therefore 
somewhat counterbalanced by the increased thermal efficiency of buildings. The net 
result is that, at the carbon prices modelled, low carbon electric heating either does 
not become cost competitive with gas boilers until relatively late in the time horizon 
(P2) or never becomes cost competitive (P3).  
Introducing deviations from rational economic behaviour also works against the 
diffusion of electric heating in the residential sector. In particular, the use of an 
individual discounting perspective as opposed to a social discounting perspective is 
shown to radically curtail the uptake of air source heat pumps (for example, compare 
P1B2 with P1B3). This is likely to be as a result of the high up front capital cost 
differential assumed between heat pumps and individual gas boilers. 
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Figure 3 – Residential building technology transitions (simulated median) 
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4.3 Road transport 
Figure 4 shows the median simulated results for technological change in the road 
vehicle fleet under each of the nine scenarios assessed. The panels are laid out for 
comparison in the same fashion illustrated earlier for power generation (Section 4.1) 
and residential heating (Section 4.2). The idealised case (P1B1) demonstrates a very 
strong trend towards the adoption of electric drivetrain vehicles in road transport, 
with the penetration of this technology in excess of 80% by 2050. The high carbon 
price applied under Idealised policy conditions has the effect of eventually making 
electric vehicles cost competitive when compared to fossil fuel vehicles, after which, 
their market penetration rapidly increases. Under Second-best policy conditions 
(P2B1, P2B2, P2B3), the more volatile carbon price leads to a less pronounced 
transition because the cost differential between electric vehicles and fossil fuel 
vehicles takes longer to close. The result is a 20-70% penetration of electric vehicles 
by 2050, depending on the differentiated behavioural parameters applied.  
Under Dysfunctional policy conditions (P3B1, P3B2, P3B3) the behavioural 
assumptions display some counterintuitive effects that merit some additional 
explanation. Under the low and inconsistent carbon price found under Dysfunctional 
policy conditions, electric vehicles are consistently more expensive than their fossil 
fuel alternatives across the entire time horizon. Under (P3B1), which has an 
assumption of cost optimal behaviour applied, there is therefore no net uptake of 
electric vehicles, because they are always the more expensive option, and because 
the decision is nearly entirely cost driven. This can be contrasted against the 
heterogeneous choice scenarios (P3B2 and P3B3). Here, electric vehicles are still 
more expensive than fossil fuel vehicles, and the rational economic choice would still 
be to select the cheaper option. However, in these scenarios, consumers are assumed 
to be only partially price sensitive (see Table 2). As their choices are more 
heterogeneous, a fraction of the market is not deterred by the increased costs of 
electric vehicles and purchases them in spite of their higher costs. As discussed earlier 
in Section 1.2.2, non-price factors can often form strong determinants of decision 
making. Under scenarios P3B2 and P3B3, the model achieves a degree of market 
penetration of electric vehicles of between 7-20% depending on the discount rate 
assumptions used.  
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Figure 4 – Road transport technology transitions (simulated median) 
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4.4 Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
Figure 5 illustrates the distribution of modelled GHG emissions levels in MtCO2 for 
each of the nine scenarios assessed, using the full range of outputs from the Monte 
Carlo analysis. Each vertically spaced chart represents one of the three different sets 
of modelled policy conditions (P1, P2, P3), while the different coloured lines on each 
chart represent the probability density of outputs for each set of behavioural 
parameters (B1, B2, B3). The light red shaded area indicates approximately the range 
146 – 180 MtCO2, which the UK Committee on Climate Change (CCC) has assessed as 
the maximum carbon budget for the UK in 2050 that is likely to be consistent with 
conditions of global equity on a per capita basis i.e. where the UK population will not 
emit more GHGs per person than any other country [97]. This target makes implicit 
assumptions about global population and the sensitivity of the climate response to 
GHG emissions, and may be revised in future, perhaps to include a “net-zero” 
emissions target (e.g. as discussed in [98]). But put simply, to hit the UK’s emissions 
targets for 2050 that are currently written into law [73], the energy system should be 
at or ideally below these levels by 2050. 
It can be seen immediately that regardless of the behavioural assumptions used (B1, 
B2, B3), none of the simulated model runs under the P3 set of conditions 
(Dysfunctional policy) came close to achieving UK climate targets, even when 
accounting for the wide range of outcomes for fuel costs and technology 
performance between 2010 – 2050. Under the P2 set of conditions (Second-best 
policy) there are visible differences in outcomes related to the behaviour settings. The 
assumption of cost-optimal behaviour and social discount rates (B1 and B2) causes 
the model to meet or exceed UK climate targets under some, but not all scenarios. If 
heterogeneous behaviour and individual discounting are assumed on the other hand 
(B3), then none of the simulated model runs come close to achieving the UK’s GHG 
targets. Finally, under the P1 set of conditions (Idealised policy), the results show that 
most, but not all scenarios with cost-optimal behaviour and/or social discount rates 
(B1 and B2) achieve climate targets, whereas most, but again, not all, scenarios with 
heterogeneous behaviour and individual discounting (B3) fail to meet climate targets. 
Overall, the analysis demonstrates that where energy system actors are assumed to 
make less than perfectly cost-optimal investment choices or are assumed to take an 
individual discounting perspective on valuing the future, then progress on climate 
mitigation at any given level of government effort has the potential to be significantly 
impeded. 
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Figure 5 – Probability density of UK emissions in 2050 
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5.0 Discussion 
 
5.1 Key insights from results 
The results in Section 4.0 illustrate the difficulty of achieving deep decarbonisation 
targets when actors interact in a myopic fashion with no advance knowledge of future 
conditions, even under the influence of strong carbon price signals. They show that 
behavioural considerations can be at least as important as technological factors. In 
particular, deviation from purely rational choice behaviour is likely to hinder, rather 
than help, climate mitigation efforts, as price signals for internalising the costs of 
GHG pollution have a dampened effect when actors are less price conscious. Finally, 
the results illustrate that anything less than idealised policymaking, where strong and 
consistent signals are sent to penalise carbon polluting technologies, risks failure. The 
results have been contrasted here against model runs that show idealised conditions 
and perfectly rational actors i.e. the conditions that approximate the outputs from 
many typical energy systems optimisation models (ESOMs). 
The analysis demonstrates the potential fragility of strategies based on the 
assumption that price signals sent by policymakers will be tightly geared to actual 
actor responses in the energy system. The diffusion of technologies in end-use 
sectors that are dominated by consumer choices, for example, may not play out as 
hoped for, due to the potentially strong effect of non-monetary factors in individual 
decision making by private citizens. This suggests that either government must 
engage strongly with consumers in an attempt to influence future choice behaviour or 
that policymakers should take a precautionary approach in areas such as home 
heating and personal mobility as part of their overall decarbonisation strategy. This 
may mean for example, that for achieving interim targets, government might need to 
pursue strategies to reduce GHGs more aggressively in areas where it exerts more 
direct influence (e.g. power, industry), in order to hedge against the risk of consumer-
driven sectors underperforming. A third possible interpretation is that price 
instruments are not the first-best policy design option for a number of key sectors, 
and government might need to consider applying normative standards that regulate 
away the opportunity for consumers to make environmentally damaging choices. 
 
5.2 Neglect of behavioural dimensions in mainstream analysis 
In writing this piece, the author risks being accused of belabouring the obvious: that 
ambitious climate policy may be extremely difficult to deliver, and that dysfunctional 
politics combined with erratic behaviour could well lead to decarbonisation targets 
being missed. A pre-emptive rejoinder then, is needed, lest this paper be seen as 
redundant: If it is obvious that individual choice behaviour and political dynamics are 
major drivers of energy transitions, then why is it routine practice for them to be 
abstracted away, ignored, or sidestepped in quantitative energy policy analysis? If 
analysts know that politics is a volatile business, and that individual choices are 
complex, why does much model-based research persist in representing these 
elements with smooth trends and simple relationships? 
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The author advances two hypotheses for discussion. The first is that the apparent 
aversion to considering socio-political factors stems from either a lack of 
opportunities for interdisciplinary training or an unwillingness to engage in 
interdisciplinary research within institutions that often lead energy policy analysis. 
There has been a historic preoccupation within contemporary energy research with 
engineering and economic factors, and a tendency for diverse fields of social science 
such as “history, sociology, philosophy, political science, and psychology” to be 
afforded only second-tier status [99]. This is not an issue that is unique to whole 
economy decarbonisation pathway analysis, but one observed in many areas across 
the field. For example, it has been common practice for years for prominent building 
energy demand models to assume temperature profiles for heating that are 
completely divorced from occupant behaviour ([100] and [101]), with the result that 
conclusions drawn for policymaking from the model outputs can be entirely 
misleading [102].  
The second hypothesis is that the framing of key policy and research challenges and 
the expectations from government and research funding agencies tend to be for 
outputs that are deterministic in character. Decision makers often display a 
reluctance towards contemplating various degrees of incertitude or indeterminacy of 
information, and as a result energy modellers are often pressured to provide simple 
explanations and recommendations ([103] and [104]). In this environment, something 
as complex and intractable as “actor behaviour” can fall easily into the bucket of 
things that are uncertain and difficult to model, and which then becomes easily 
relegated to a footnote in the assumptions section of a report rather than a 
prominent driver of the analysis undertaken. This challenge can be accentuated in 
policy environments where naïve overconfidence in the effectiveness of market 
mechanisms is pervasive [105], because efforts to question or explore uncertainties 
around the essential rationality of economic actors are met with at best, indifference 
and at worst, ridicule. Finally, there is often a wider reluctance by policymakers to 
discuss or contemplate analysis that shows policy failure, because in the political 
arena failure is frequently punished rather than being seen as a learning opportunity. 
 
5.3 Implications for research and science-policy discourse 
Regardless of the veracity of the two hypotheses discussed above, the risks of the 
status quo continuing are significant. National level policymakers risk focusing on a 
few deterministic model runs with narrowly defined assumptions and ignoring the 
need to undertake a broader analysis of uncertainties, including behaviour. This gives 
the appearance of certainty where none exists, closing down debate and ultimately 
leading to ineffective policy design ([103] and [75]). Researchers engaged in advising 
policymakers should caution strongly against this trend and encourage analysis that 
embraces key uncertainties and encompasses a diversity of outcomes, including the 
potential for policy failure. In this context, ESOMs are powerful tools for normative 
assessment of decarbonisation pathways but there is an increasing need for more 
exploratory analysis aimed at investigating the dynamics of future energy transitions 
and assessing climate target feasibility in so-called “second best” worlds where 
political factors render certain market failures impossible to correct [49].  
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There is a greater need for interdisciplinary research that integrates the social and 
behavioural drivers of energy systems alongside the technological and the economic 
([106] and [107]). The analysis presented in this paper illustrates that even with 
identical technology and resource assumptions, the behavioural and political 
dimensions to deep decarbonisation pathways can effectively make or break the 
viability of an energy transition. This is arguably neither emphasised sufficiently nor 
explored with much enthusiasm in many policy assessments for future energy 
systems, which tend to overlook behavioural complexity [62].  
Technologies do not evolve in isolation from society or the economy (see [108], [109], 
and [110]). There is no doubt that behavioural parameters are complex to estimate 
from empirical data and to translate into quantitative models [111]. But that does not 
mean that uncertainties linked to actor behaviour can be safely assumed to have a 
negligible effect. There is a strong case for further research investigating both the 
micro-economic decisions of individual actors and how different key decision makers 
in the energy system interact and respond to one another. Energy modelling must 
also embrace the uncertain nature of energy transitions and the real possibility of 
failure in climate policy in order to assist in developing realistic strategies for 
achieving desirable outcomes. Nothing is gained from spinning future fictions of easy 
success.  
The energy modelling community is already making steps towards exploring second-
best insights by introducing resource or technology deployment constraints to mimic 
real-world barriers (e.g. [112]) or introducing delays to represent inertia in decision 
making (e.g. [113]). Model users can mimic non-cost barriers to technology diffusion 
by using hurdle rates and heterogeneous decision making [114], incorporating 
behavioural demand responses to higher energy prices using price elasticities of 
demand [115], or implementing myopic foresight (e.g. [116], [117]). This paper has 
illustrated one such approach in a system dynamic model that combines all of the 
above elements, but further research is clearly needed for these techniques to 
become widespread.  
More explicit modelling of actors and institutions may require new approaches, such 
as exploratory modelling with new tools that try to integrate techno-economic detail, 
actor heterogeneity and transition pathway dynamics [118], or attempts to “bridge” 
[119] between analytical disciplines such as quantitative modelling and socio-
technical transitions studies (e.g. [120] and [121]). It is also possible that for 
meaningful policy engagement, models might need to be applied in a more iterative, 
participatory fashion with key decision makers [76], following a “modelling as a 
service” strategy where policymakers participate more actively in the process, rather 
than a “modelling as a product” approach where analysis is undertaken remotely from 
stakeholders and later presented as a fait accompli [122]. 
 
6.0 Conclusions 
This paper started by discussing the real political and social barriers to climate 
mitigation efforts that arise from the interactions of multiple actors and the micro-
economic behaviours that influence their investment decisions. A failure to account 
for these effects is arguably already leading to poor policy design for energy 
transitions. It is common practice in much of the literature to abstract the interactions 
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of multiple stakeholders into a single, all-powerful decision maker that handles 
resource allocation on the basis of maximising social utility. It is also typical to assume 
that price setting policies will translate directly into economically rational, “optimal” 
choices across a wide range of diverse actors.  
Both of these assumptions are abstractions from complex real world phenomena that 
must not be overlooked, as they represent key drivers of energy system change. An 
improved depiction of human factors is urgently required in order to improve the 
utility of energy economic models for policy assessment. Not doing so risks producing 
well-meaning analysis that implies that ambitious decarbonisation targets remain 
comfortably within reach, when in fact this is only true in so-called “first best” policy 
futures where all externalities can be internalised, and where all decision makers 
behave as rational utility-maximising agents.  
This paper has attempted to challenge the common assumptions about how actors in 
the energy system might behave using a stochastic system dynamic model of the UK 
energy system, the Behaviour Lifestyles and Uncertainty Energy model (BLUE). The 
work illustrates energy transitions featuring multiple actors, acting with myopic 
foresight, heterogeneous choice behaviour, and with varying perspectives on valuing 
the future. The results show that the dynamics of multiple actors, making non-
optimal micro-economic investment decisions, has the potential to derail strategies 
for deep decarbonisation that assume cost optimal choice behaviour and render 
ambitious GHG reduction targets extremely difficult to achieve. This raises important 
questions as to why the deep uncertainties associated with human behaviour are 
routinely overlooked in policy assessment. The implications are that model-based 
energy systems research should in future aim to take a more explicitly socio-technical 
perspective, or at the very least, to clearly include significant behavioural and political 
uncertainties in the analysis framework, not just as footnotes. 
Returning then, to the title of this piece: what is the value of modelling “actors 
behaving badly”? The work presented in this paper serves as an illustration of the 
potential fragility of analysis based on cost-optimisation approaches, unless backed 
by a rigorous assessment of behavioural and political uncertainties. If something as 
simple as the assumption that people might not behave exactly as hoped for or that 
politics might interfere with clear market signals is enough to blow apart a carefully 
constructed strategy for transitioning society to a low carbon future, then surely, 
these strategies must be re-examined and subjected to greater scrutiny? Researchers 
cannot know what the future holds for technologies, the economy, or society. But 
history shows that politics can be messy and that people are often risk averse and 
mercurial. 
Energy systems modelling plays an important role in international efforts to avoid 
environmental decline, population displacement, increased early mortality, and the 
other undesirable outcomes associated with a rapidly warming world. The energy 
modelling community is forward thinking, ambitious, and committed to working with 
policymakers to find solutions to some of the grand challenges of our time. The work 
presented in this paper demonstrates the value in questioning the basis for some of 
the key assumptions found in our models, and how we use them to inform decisions 
made under conditions of deep uncertainty. These questions are uncomfortable 
because they challenge deeply held conventions and belief structures on both sides of 
the science-policy interface. We should ask them more often. 
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9.0 Appendix 
 
9.1 Actor Behavioural Parameters 
The behavioural parameter ranges used in this study are given below in Table 1. 
Sector level actors in the BLUE model can be configured with: 
• Demand elasticities e, describing actor sensitivity to changes in prices 
• Market heterogeneity v, describing actor propensity to cost-optimise 
• Intangible costs i, describing actor perception of non-monetary costs 
• Hurdle rates r, describing actor sensitivity to up-front investment 
• Retrofitting/replacement rate b, describing actor investment cycles 
 
Table 3 – Actor behaviour parameters (L=Low, C=Central, H=High) 
Behavioural 
Parameter 
Power Residential Commercial Industrial 
Transport 
(Road) 
Transport 
(Air) 
Transport 
(Rail) 
Transport 
(Marine) 
Demand 
elasticities (e), 
based on [1] 
- 
L=-0.1 
C=-0.25  
H=-0.40 
L=-0.01 
C=-0.1  
H=-0.15 
L=-0.01 
C=-0.03  
H=-0.05 
L=-0.15 
C=-0.30  
H=-0.50 
L=-0.40 
C=-0.70  
H=-1.00 
L=-0.60 
C=-0.80  
H=-1.10 
L=-0.01 
C=-0.03 
H=-0.06 
Market 
heterogeneity 
(v), see 
Section 4.3 
Price insensitive, L=0, H=4 
Partial price sensitivity, L=5, H=9 
Strong price sensitivity, L=10, H=19 
Cost optimising behaviour, L=20, H=50 
Intangible 
costs (i) 
- 0 0 0 0 
Hurdle rate  
(r) 
Implicit in 
LCOE (see 
Table 4) 
Social, L=3%, H=6%, for example [2] 
Individual L=9%, H= 17%, for example [3] 
Retrofitting / 
replacement 
rate (b) 
Technology 
specific, 
based on [4,5]  
Every 15 
years 
Every 15 
years 
Every 20 
years 
Every 10 
years 
- 
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9.2 Heterogeneity Parameter, v 
The effect of adopting different values for the heterogeneity parameter, v are 
illustrated below with an example comparing two technologies against one another. 
As v approaches zero, the costs of different options play little to no role in investment 
choices (i.e. implying that non-monetary factors are the driver), while for high values 
of v the model displays highly cost optimising behaviour. 
Figure 2 – Visualising the Impact of the Heterogeneity Parameter  
 
Table 2 –  Qualitative ranges for defining actor heterogeneity 
Definition v Description 
Cost optimising 
behaviour 
20-50 
Actors will choose the least cost option almost every time, even if the savings are very 
small. For example, at v=50, a 5% saving results in a 95% uptake.  
Strong price 
sensitivity 
10-19 
In this range, actors react strongly to prices, but prices do not guide all their decisions. 
For example, at v=15, A >30% saving would be needed to drive replacement of the entire 
capital stock with the lowest cost alternative. 
Partial price 
sensitivity 
5-9 
At this setting, actors are price conscious but often very large cost savings are required 
before a total switch to new technologies occurs. For example, at v=5, a >70% saving is 
required for complete replacement. 
Price insensitive 
behaviour 
0-4 
With these inputs, actors do not react strongly to prices. Even large cost savings might 
not cause a complete shift to the new technology. 
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9.3 Key Equations 
 
9.3.1 Energy Service Demands and Energy Prices 
Energy service demands are assumed to grow in line with user-defined exogenous 
drivers that are calibrated to reflect individual national circumstances. Energy service 
demands are affected by demand elasticity parameters and the rate of change in 
energy prices between t=t and t=1-1. This is expressed as: 
𝐷𝑠,𝑡 = 𝐷𝑠,𝑡−1×[1 + 𝐺𝑠]×[𝑒𝑠,𝑡−1(1 − ∆𝑃𝑠,𝑡−1)]     (1) 
Where D = energy service demand, s = sector, t = time period, G = demand driver, P = 
energy price, and e = price elasticity of demand. 
Energy prices grow by a user input rate through time, which can be aligned with 
policy projections or randomised as desired by the user. Energy prices contain a fuel 
price component and a carbon price component. 
𝐸𝑓,𝑡 = [𝑃𝑓,𝑡−1×(1 + 𝑘𝑓)] + [𝑧𝑓,𝑡×{𝐶𝑂2,𝑡−1×(1 + 𝑗)}]    (2) 
Where E = energy price, P = fuel price, t = time period, f = fuel type, k = periodic fuel 
price increase/decrease, CO2 = carbon price, j = periodic carbon price 
increase/decrease and z = specific emissions intensity. 
 
9.3.2 Capital Stock Replacement 
Each sector evaluates the net present value of competing technology options. The 
net present value of available technologies is expressed as: 
𝑁𝑠,𝑡,𝑥 = 𝐶𝑠,𝑡,𝑥 + 𝑖𝑠,𝑡,𝑥 +∑ [
𝐷𝑠,𝑡×𝑃𝑓,𝑡×𝑌𝑠,𝑡,𝑥
−1
(1+𝑟𝑠,𝑡)
𝑡 ]
𝑇
𝑡       (3) 
Where N = net present value, s = sector, t = time period, x = energy technology, C = 
investment cost, i = intangible cost, D = energy service demand, f = fuel type, Y = 
efficiency, r = hurdle rate, T =investment time horizon 
The net present value then serves as an input into the model’s evaluation of 
technology diffusion into the marketplace. 
𝑀𝑠,𝑡,𝑥 = [𝑀𝑠,𝑡−1,𝑥×(1− 𝑏𝑠,𝑡)] + [𝑀𝑠,𝑡−1×𝑏𝑠,𝑡×(
𝑁𝑠,𝑡
−𝑣𝑠,𝑡
∑ 𝑁𝑠,𝑡
−𝑣𝑠,𝑡
𝑥
)]   (4) 
Where M = technology portfolio, s = sector, t = time period, x = energy technology, b 
= retrofitting/replacement rate, N = net present value, v = heterogeneity parameter 
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9.4 Data Sources and Calibration 
 
9.4.1 Base Year Energy Service Demands 
The BLUE model is calibrated for the United Kingdom using official government 
statistics and a 2010 base year. Energy service demands originally given in other units 
are converted to petajoules (PJ). 
Table 3 – BLUE Base Year Calibration Data 
Parameter Sub-Parameter 
Value  
(L=Low, C=Central, H=High) 
Units Notes 
Energy 
Service 
Demands 
Residential 
Commercial 
Industrial 
Transport (Road) 
Transport (Air) 
Transport (Rail) 
Transport (Marine) 
2064 
821 
1093 
1691 
515 
42 
38 
PJ 
UK Department of Energy and 
Climate Change (DECC) [6]. 
 
9.4.2 Fuel Costs and Emission Factors 
BLUE currently employs a stylised representation of fuel types. For example, various 
types of liquid transport fuels are aggregated together into “Oil”, while different coal 
grades (e.g. bituminous coal, anthracite, etc.) are covered by “Coal”. Electricity costs 
and emission intensities are determined dynamically based on the generation 
portfolio used in each time period (see below). 
Table 4 – BLUE Fuel Costs and Emission Factors 
Parameter Sub-Parameter 
Value  
(L=Low, C=Central, 
H=High) 
Units Notes 
Fossil Fuel 
Prices 
Oil 
Coal 
Gas 
Dynamic 
Dynamic 
Dynamic 
£/GJ 
Triangular distributions based on 
projections from UK Department of 
Energy and Climate Change (DECC) 
[7]. 
Fossil Fuel 
Emission 
Intensities 
Oil 
Coal 
Gas 
0.0917 
0.0763 
0.0517 
tCO2/GJ 
US Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) [8] 
 
9.4.3 Power Generation 
BLUE employs 9 different power technologies that characterise the base year 
generation fleet as well as capturing future options for electricity supply. The techno-
economic performance of different options is expressed in terms of their levelised 
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costs of energy (LCOE, see [9]), which is determined from unit estimates of capital 
costs, fixed operation and maintenance costs, and variable operation and 
maintenance costs taken from a range of government and academic sources (see 
below). BLUE’s stylized representation of the power sector determines total 
generation requirements against a user defined capacity margin, while the 
contribution to total capacity requirements from individual technologies varies by 
technology. 
Table 5 – Power Generation Parameters 
Parameter Sub-Parameter 
Value 
(L=Low, C=Central, H=High) 
Units Notes 
Power 
Generation 
Technology 
Portfolio 
Gas 
Coal  
Coal-CCS 
Gas-CCS 
Nuclear 
Onshore Wind 
Offshore Wind 
Large Scale Solar PV 
Bioenergy-CCS 
35.3 
35.8 
0 
0 
10.9 
0 
4.218 
0 
 0 
GW 
UK Department of Energy and 
Climate Change [10]. 
Power 
Generation 
Technology 
Capital Costs 
Gas 
Coal  
Coal-CCS 
Gas-CCS 
Nuclear 
Onshore Wind 
Offshore Wind 
Large Scale Solar PV 
Bioenergy-CCS 
L=601, C=669, H=805 
L=1488, C=1648, H=1865 
L=3387, C=3584, H=3856 
L=1462, C=1634, H=1888 
L=5082, H=5767 
L=1221, C=1532, H=1910 
L=2046, C=2685, H=3650 
L=1038, H=1140 
L=2433, C=4055, H=5677 
£/kW 
Triangular distributions used where 
literature provides low (L), central 
(C) and high (H) values, uniform 
distributions used for high / low 
data.  
Sources include a range of 
government and academic 
references converted to 2010 base 
year [4,5,11,12] 
Power 
Generation 
Technology 
Fixed 
Operating 
Costs (FOM) 
Gas 
Coal  
Coal-CCS 
Gas-CCS 
Nuclear 
Onshore Wind 
Offshore Wind 
Large Scale Solar PV 
Bioenergy-CCS 
L=14.7, C=27.4, H=40.3 
L=15.4, C=42.6, H=66.4 
L=39.3, C=81.0, H=120.0 
L=26.4, C=45.5, H=67.7 
L=65.5, C=87.2, H=110.0 
C=15.0 
L=63.0, H=71.0 
L=24.0, H=27.0 
L=96.0, C=96.0, H=96.0 
£/kWh/
year 
Triangular distributions used where 
literature provides low (L), central 
(C) and high (H) values, uniform 
distributions used for high / low 
data.  
Sources include a range of 
government and academic 
references converted to 2010 base 
year [4,5,11,12] 
Power 
Generation 
Technology 
Variable 
Operating 
Costs (VOM) 
Gas 
Coal  
Coal-CCS 
Gas-CCS 
Nuclear 
Onshore Wind 
Offshore Wind 
Large Scale Solar PV 
L=0, C=0.0001, H=0.0002 
L=0.0008, C=0.001, H=0.0012 
L=0.0093, C=0.0103, H=0.0113 
L=0.0035, C=0.0044, H=0.0053 
C=0.0285 
C=0.003 
C=0.0015 
0 
£/kWh/
year 
Triangular distributions used where 
literature provides low (L), central 
(C) and high (H) values, uniform 
distributions used for high / low 
data.  
Sources include a range of 
government and academic 
references converted to 2010 base 
year [4,5,11,12]. For some 
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Bioenergy-CCS L=0.012, C=0.024, H=0.036 technologies sources VOM costs in 
FOM values. 
Power 
Generation 
Technology 
Thermal 
Efficiency 
Gas 
Coal  
Coal-CCS 
Gas-CCS 
Nuclear 
Onshore Wind 
Offshore Wind 
Large Scale Solar PV 
Bioenergy-CCS 
L=57, C=58, H=60 
L=43, C=44, H=45 
L=35.8, C=36.7, H=37.5 
L=47.5, C=48.3, H=50 
- 
- 
- 
- 
L=25, C=26.1, H=27.2 
% 
Triangular distributions used where 
literature provides low (L), central 
(C) and high (H) values, uniform 
distributions used for high / low 
data.  
Sources include a range of 
government and academic 
references converted to 2010 base 
year [4,5,11,12]. 
Power 
Generation 
Technology 
Deployment 
Constraints 
Gas 
Coal  
Coal-CCS 
Gas-CCS 
Nuclear 
Onshore Wind 
Offshore Wind 
Large Scale Solar PV 
Bioenergy-CCS 
- 
- 
- 
- 
40 
20 
60 
20 
17 
GW 
Nuclear constraint based on build 
rate assumptions for model time 
horizon. 
Wind power constraints based on 
reports commissioned by 
government [13] and by industry 
[14]. 
Bioenergy constraint is consistent 
with not exceeding resource limits 
implied by CCC Bioenergy Review 
Further Land Conversion (FLC) 
scenario [15,16]. 
Transmission 
and 
Distribution 
Losses 
- 7.9 % 
UK Digest of United Kingdom 
Energy Statistics [10] 
Capacity 
Margin 
- 20 % 
Based on Royal Academy of 
Engineering [17] 
Power 
Generation 
Technology 
De-Rating 
Factors 
Gas 
Coal  
Coal-CCS 
Gas-CCS 
Nuclear 
Onshore Wind 
Offshore Wind 
Large Scale Solar PV 
Bioenergy-CCS 
0.88 
0.85 
0.88 
0.85 
0.81 
L=0.17, H=0.24 
L=0.17, H=0.24 
0 
0.88 
% 
Based on Ofgem generator de-rating 
factors by technology type [18] 
Note we conservatively assume that 
Solar PV does not contribute to 
meeting UK peak capacity 
requirements. 
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9.4.4 Building Sectors 
BLUE currently features 3 types of building heating technology. Disaggregation of 
energy demands into heat and electricity is based on UK government statistics for the 
residential [19] and commercial sectors [20]. 
Table 6 – Building Sector Parameters 
Parameter Sub-Parameter 
Value 
(L=Low, C=Central, H=High) 
Units Notes 
Residential 
Heating 
Technology 
Portfolio 
Gas Boiler 
Elec. Resistive Heating 
Air Source Heat Pump 
92.8 
7.2 
0 
% 
UK Department of Energy and 
Climate Change (DECC) [6]. 
Residential 
Heating 
Technology 
Costs 
Gas Boilers 
Elec. Resistive Heating 
Air Source Heat Pumps 
L=2500, H=3000 
L=1750, H=4025 
L=8400, H=10500 
£ 
Uniform distributions used to span 
range of estimates [21]. 
Residential 
Heating 
Efficiency 
Gas Boilers 
Elec. Resistive Heating 
Air Source Heat Pumps 
94 
100 
250-275 
% Based on NERA and AEA [21] 
Commercial 
Heating 
Technology 
Portfolio 
Gas Boilers 
Elec. Resistive Heating 
Air Source Heat Pumps 
87 
13 
0 
% 
Based on UK Department of Energy 
and Climate Change [20] 
Commercial 
Heating 
Technology 
Costs 
Gas Boilers 
Elec. Resistive Heating 
Air Source Heat Pumps 
18142 
42653 
29975 
£ 
Based on NERA and AEA [21]. 
Report only gives a single value for 
representative heat pump 
installation so no ranges used 
Commercial 
Heating 
Efficiency 
Gas Boilers 
Elec. Resistive Heating 
Air Source Heat Pumps 
94 
100 
350 
% Based on NERA and AEA [21] 
 
9.4.5 Industrial Sector 
The industrial sector in BLUE employs a stylized representation that allows fuel 
switching on a cost basis, but does not capture the details of individual industrial 
processes.  
Table 7 – Industrial Sector Parameters 
Parameter Sub-Parameter 
Value 
(L=Low, C=Central, H=High) 
Units Notes 
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Industrial 
Fuel 
Portfolio 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Electricity 
0.088 
0.210 
0.357 
0.344 
% 
Based on UK Department of Energy 
and Climate Change [22] 
 
9.4.6 Road Transport Sector 
BLUE currently features 2 types of road vehicle technology – a generic electric 
drivetrain vehicle and a generic fossil fuel vehicle. 
Table 8 – Road Transport Sector Parameters 
Parameter Sub-Parameter 
Value 
(L=Low, C=Central, H=High) 
Units Notes 
Road 
Transport 
Technology 
Portfolio 
Fossil Fuel Vehicles 
Electric Vehicles 
100 
0 
% 
Electric vehicle sales in the UK were 
less than 0.1% of annual sales in 
2012 [23], so it can be assumed that 
as a fraction of the road fleet 
composition they were negligible in 
2010. 
Road 
Transport 
Technology 
Costs 
Fossil Fuel Vehicles 
Electric Vehicles 
14330 
L=25620, C=20490, H=59440 
£ 
Representative values for C/D class 
vehicles, based on [24]. 
Road 
Transport 
Efficiency 
Fossil Fuel Vehicles 
Electric Vehicles 
L=2500, H=3000 
1389 
km/GJ 
Fossil vehicle range based on UK 
Department for Transport [25], with 
electric vehicle value based on 
International Energy Agency [26] 
 
9.4.7 Other Transport Sectors 
The non-road transport sectors have few technological mitigation options in the 
current model version. Future changes to aviation technologies are captured as 
reductions in CO2 intensity per unit of energy demand to reflect efficiency 
improvements that are likely to arise over the time horizon at zero marginal costs 
from existing R&D investments [27]. Radical design changes to aircraft and/or air 
travel infrastructure are not represented. Fuel switching and technological change in 
the marine and rail sectors is also not presently captured in the current model version. 
These latter two sectors are currently small in absolute consumption terms, together 
comprising 3.5% of UK transport energy demand [6]. 
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